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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
RODERICK F. ELLIOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vs.JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
10530

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The appellant appeals from the judgment of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, denying
his petition for writ of habeas corpus without hearing.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County,
challenging his detention in the Utah State Prison
by the respondent and assailing his revocation of
Parole by the Utah State Board of Pardons. On Jan-

2
uary 5, 1966, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
Judge, entered a memorandum decision denyin~
the application for a writ of habeas corpus, indicating that the writ challenged administrative procedures in the Prison and stated that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the issues contained in
the application for writ of habeas corpus. An appeal
was subsequently filed and an appearance entered
in the case by Mr. Robert L. Lord (R. 47). Subsequently, Mr. Lord has apparently indicated that he is unwilling to represent the appellant on appeal, no
reason for the withdrawal appears of record. The Attorney General of the State of Utah wrote the appellant, indicating that he should request counsel
from the Supreme Court and offered the assistance
of his office in endeavoring to obtain counsel for the
appellant. The appellant has recently advised the
Attorney General, with a copy of the letter being
sent to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, that he did
not desire counsel and appellant has filed a brief
prose.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, a prisoner confined in the Utah
State Prison, filed a complaint for writ of habeas
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County. Attached to the petition as exhibits are numerous let-
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ters and correspondence. The basis upon which the
appellant contends that he is entitled to habeas
corpus are summarized on page 6 of his petition. He
alleges, first that no warrant of arrest was issued at
the time of his initial incarceration in the Salt Lake
County Jail upon arrest for the violation of his paro~e. He further contends that he was not brought
before the next regular board meeting of the Utah
State Board of Pardons. This, apparently, is based
upon a contention that the order entered by the
Board of Pardons revoking the parole of the appellant indicates that the case was continued until the
meeting of the Board of Pardons held on the 20th
day of July, 1965 (R. 9). The record, however, does
show that the Board of Pardons recites that it was
fully and completely advised in the premises and
that the board had reviewed the evidence and
heard and interviewed all interested persons, including the appellant, and ordered the revocation
of the appellant's parole. Third, the appellant contends that he was not afforded counsel at the time
of the hearing on his parole revocation. In addition,
the appellant alleges that he was refused transcript
and minute entries relating to the offense for which
he was initially convicted. The record discloses
that the appellant filed a motion and order on the
28th day of July, 1965, asking that he have a transcript, minute entries and other documents covering his conviction in an effort to obtain a writ of
error to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 14). Judge Aldon
J. Anderson entered a order denying the appellant's
request for transcript and minute entries on the
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grounds that he had not shown any good cause fo~
their production (R. 16). On August 9, 1965, Judge
Anderson wrote the appellant, inddicating that he
would have to present a proper petition showing
grounds to obtain the transcript. Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion and order for the appointment
of counsel and for transcript, documents and minute
entries in his case in which he merely alleged that
the judgment and sentence were contrary to law
and that he believed he was entitled to release on
habeas corpus (R. 19). The appellant also contended
that he had a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. s 1963
for deprivation of federal civil rights. Judge Anderson again refused to grant an order for the furnishing of the transcript to the appellant. Finally, the
appellant contends that he did not have a fair and
impartial hearing before the Utah State Board of
Pardons. Appellant's petition does not detail the
facts upon which he contends that he did not receive a fair hearing before the Board of Pardons.
However, he does indicate that he couldn't have a
fair hearing because the chairman of the Utah
State Board of Pardons was chairman of the board
of trustees of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association (Tr. 6). Further, the appellant contends that
hearsay evidence was admitted at the time of his
hearing before the Board of Pardons.
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's
brief merely refer to Case No. 10548 and state that
the cause is the same in this case as was presented
in the other case. That case involved an application
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for habeas corpus to this court which was denied
because it involved the same matters pressed in
this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT HEARING
SINCE (1) THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, (2) THE COMPLAINT FAILED
TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF.

Rule 65B(f) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
dealing with habeas corpus, provides that a complaint for writ of habeas corpus must recite:
"that the legality of the imprisonment or restraint
has not already been judged upon a prior proceeding; whether another complaint for the same relief
has been filed and relief thereunder denied by any
court***."

In Davis vs. Hollowell. 216 Iowa 1178, 250 N.W.
647, the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that a petition must recite that there has not been a previous
adjudication or specify, if there has been a previous adjudication, the reasons for the denial of relief in the previous adjudication. The court concluded that this was mandatory and that a petition
for writ of habeas corpus not containing the appropriate recitation could not be jurisdictionally entertained.
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Consequently, the trial court was justified in
denying the appellant's complaint for writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds that it failed to comply with
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is submitted that the trial court acted properly
in concluding that the complaint stated no substantive basis for habeas corpus.
The appellant's contention that because a warrant for his arrest by the Utah State Board of Pardons
was not issued until after he had actually been arrested that he is entitled to habeas corpus cannot
be sustained. There is an order attached to his petition showing that the appellant has appeared before the Utah State Board of Pardons and his previously granted parole recoked. The mere fact that
there has been an arrest without a warrant would
not prevent the Board of Pardons from assuming
jurisdiction over the appellant and, thereafter, revoking his parole. Further, in the instant case, the
appellant's petition indicates that prior to the time
he was adjudicated to have violated his parole and
his parole was revoked by the Utah State Board of
Pardons, that a proper warrant of arrest had been
issued. Under these circumstances, there is no basis
for habeas corpus, Washington v. Renouf. 5 U.2d
185, 299 P.2d 620.
The appellant's contention that he did not appear before the Utah State Board of Pardons at the
next regular meeting after his appearance on June
30, 1965, at which time his parole was revoked, affords him no basis for hctbeas corpus. The order at-

7
tached to the appellant's complaint for writ of
habeas corpus expressly indicated that the Board
of Pardons had heard the witnesses, including the
appellant, and that his parole was revoked. The fact
that the board may continue the matter on its agenda
to discuss or to consider does not require that the
appellant be present. The order revoking the parole
was entered and the failure to have the appellant
otherwise appear before the board at some subsequent time did not in any way entitle the appellant
to a writ of habeas corpus. Further, habeas corpus
IS not an appropriate remedy to require the Board
of Pardons to entertain anything the appellant has
to say to it. Unrer these circumstances, there would
be no basis for this court or any court to make inquiry into the actions of the Utah State Board of
Pardons. See Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction, p. 559. The appellant had his hearing and no
further appearances before the board were required.
The appellant's contention that he should have
been furnished counsel to represent him at the parole revocation proceeding cannot be sustained.
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that there is no right to counsel in a parole revocation hearing.
In Washington v. Hagen. 287 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir.
1960), cert. denied 366 U.S. 970 (1961), Judge Goodrich reviewed the course of decisions on the issue
and reaffirmed the majority position that counsel is
not required under any constitutional sense, nor
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even under a policy determination, at parole revocation hearings. The court said:
"We think the conclusion reached below was right

~owever, because we think the practice for more tha~

fifty years has been to allow a prisoner a hearing but
n_ot ~ep~esentation by counsel. We think the practice is right because the matter of whether a prisoner
is a good risk for release on parole, or shown himself
not to be a good risk, is a disciplinary matter which
by its very nature, should be left in the hands of
those charged with the responsibility for deciding
the question."

The court went on to say with reference to the
conduct of a parolee and his attempted progress towards rehabilitation:
"The progress of that attempt must be measured, not
by legal rules, but by the judgment of those who
make it their professional business. So long as that
judgment is fairly and honestly exercised, we think
there is no place for lawyer representation and law·
yer opposition in a matter of revocation of parole.''

A similar position has been reached by several
other federal courts.
Recently, in Gaskins v. Kennedy, 350 F.2d 313
(4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that an indigent defendant was not entitled to
assigned counsel at a parole revocation proceeding.
The court followed its previous ruling to the same
effect in Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1964).
In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 480 (1935), the Su·
preme Court indicated that the constitutional re·
quirements of due process were not applicable tc
probation revocation cases.
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In Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert Counsel in the Penal Correctional Process, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 803 (1961), p. 817, it is stated:
"The predominant view of the federal courts in probation revocation proceedings - that neither the
specific constitutional guarantees appropriate to
criminal trials nor the command of procedural justice of due process clause are applicable - has consistently enough been extended to parole revocation
matters as well.*** It follows, of course, that there
is no constitutional right to counsel."

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hiatt v.
Campagana, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), affirmed 340
U.S. 880 (1950), ruled that there was no constitutional right to counsel at parole revocation proceedings.
In Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P.
2d 633 (1951), the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that
an individual was not entitled to counsel at a paro]e
revocation hearing. The court relied heavily upon
the decision of McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160
P.2d 721 (1945), to the effect that a parolee was not
entitled as a matter of right to a notice of hearing
for a revocation of parole. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Rossman stated:
"The board undoubtably takes into consideration impressions of the selected parolee that it gained in the
manner it just indicated. It analyzes symptoms and
character rather than weighs evidence. It is required
to determine a non-legal problem; that is, whether
the parolee is about to become a recusant. A prudent
performance of a board member's duty may call for
intuition rather than knowledge of the rules or procedure and for training in the social sciences rather
than a course of study in a law school."

10
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court correctly denied the appellant's complaint for habeas
corpus to the extent that it was based upon a contention that he should have been afforded counsel
at the time of his parole revocation proceedinJ,
Parole is a matter of grace and the prisoner remains
in custodia legis, McCoy v. Harris, supra, and consequently, is still, technically, a prisoner. Further,
a parole revocation hearing is not a court trial, but
rather, an inquiry into the character and conduct of
the parolee to see whether additional institutionalization is necessary. The need for counsel, in ~ c:onstitutional sense, is absent and, indeed, the presence of counsel may very well frustrate the tr'je
rehabilitation of a parolee by causing the board to
focus its attention on factors other than the rehabilitative needs of the individual parolee. There '.s
nothing, of course, which would prevent the Boa;d
of Pardons from allowing counsel to be present,
which it does on many instances, but there was no
obligation to see that counsel was appointed for
the appellant.
The appellant's contention that he is entitled to
release by habeas corpus or consideration under
writ of habeas corpus because of the failure of
Judge Anderson to grant the appellant a copy of
his trail transcript and allied papers cannot be su·
stained. At no time did the appellant indicate any
reasonable or just cause for the production of the
documents. His allegations never indicated th:;'.
there was any procedural or other irregularity in l:~s
conviction. !t is apparent that appellant merely de
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sired the papers and transcript to peruse to ascertain if there was any basis that he might now collaterally attack his conviction. Under similar circumstances, the courts have been unanimous in
denying motions of prisoners to have transcripts
prepared at state expense.
In United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir.
1963), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated
that there was no right of a prisoner to have a transcript merely for his examination in order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for applying for collateral relief.
In United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1964), the court adhered to its position. The court
stated that an indigent prisoner is not entitled to a
transcript of his criminal trial at government expense without a showing of a need for the transcript
where he wants it merely to comb the record in
hope of discovering some flaw. The court said this
was true, even though the defendant indicated and
alleged that he believed he was entitled to relief
that he would seek by way of collateral attack on his
conviction. It is apparent, therefore, that since the
appellant was unable to show good cause to the
court why the transcript should be prepared that
there was no basis for a writ of habeas corpus on the
allegation that there was a denial of a transcript.
The appellant's final contention that he did not
receive a impartial hearing before the Utah State
Board of Pardons is not sustained. There are no
facts indicating the appellant's failure to receive a
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fair hearing, and the actual records, of which this
court may take judicial notice, show that the appellant plead guilty to parole violations. The contention that hearsay evidence was received is, of
course, not a valid one, since hearsay is not objectionable in an administrative proceeding. Hack·
ford v. Industrial Commission. 11 U.2d 312, 358 P.2d
899 (1961: Cooper, State Administrative Law, Vol. i,
p. 404, 410 (1965). The appellant's contention that
the Honorable George C. Lattimer, Chairman of the
Utah State Board of Pardons, could not sit on his
case because he was a member of the Board of
Trustees of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association, has no merit. That, in and of itself, evidences
no bias, except possibly, a favortism towards defendants. In any event, the allegation is wholly
absurd and without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, it is submitted that the
trial court ruled correctly that the matters alleged
in the appellant's petition raised only issues for ad·
ministrative determination. This court should affirm.
Respectfully Submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Ass't. Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent

